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[In Sons of Gwalia, the High Court of Australia found that shareholders who had been allegedly 
induced into purchasing shares in a company shortly prior to its insolvency by misrepresentations 
and inadequate market disclosure were able to lodge claims as creditors in the company’s voluntary 
administration. The High Court interpreted the statutory subordination provisions in the Corpora-
tions Act 2001 (Cth) narrowly, with the result that many shareholders will be permitted to stand 
alongside non-shareholder creditors (as contingent creditors) in corporate insolvencies. Whilst this 
has the effect of diluting the returns to unsecured creditors, it also reinforces the importance of 
corporate disclosure and other consumer protection laws by providing misled shareholders with a 
remedy during the company’s insolvency. This case note discusses the High Court’s decision and 
comments on where the ruling fits into the broader corporate insolvency landscape. The case note 
then looks to the future to comment on where the law of shareholder subordination may be headed.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
The classic decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (‘Salomon’)1 is authority 
for the proposition that a properly registered company is a separate legal entity 
from its owners (the shareholders) and managers (the directors and executive 
officers). Despite the longstanding place of Salomon in Australian corporate 
law,2 the ramifications of the separate legal entity principle have still not yet 
been fully absorbed by the business or legal communities. One of the important 
consequences of Salomon is that shareholders, regardless of their control through 
share ownership, are not to be equated with the corporate entity.3 
This separation between the corporation and the shareholders has been facili-
tated by the legislative protection of limited liability for shareholders and the 
increasing size and importance of equity capital markets. The limited liability of 
shareholders allows the creation of diversified investment portfolios, which, 
when combined with the increasing activity of share market trading, has greatly 
contributed to a dispersed share ownership in most publicly traded corporations.4 
The social, economic and legal climate has, since the first general private 
corporations legislation in 1862,5 undergone dramatic transformation.6 In recent 
times, government policies have favoured encouraging even greater private 
investment in businesses through the large pools of investments accumulated in 
superannuation and the ‘Future Fund’.7 As part of the changing economic 
landscape, the superannuation industry has become a ‘permanent and essential’ 
feature of the Australian financial system.8 The Chairperson of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) has recognised that ‘[n]ow, 
more than ever before, consumers must have confidence in the market in which 
they are investing and must be in a position to make informed decisions about 
what to invest in.’9 
 
 1 [1897] AC 22. 
 2 See, eg, Hamilton v Whitehead (1988) 166 CLR 121; Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd 
(2004) 217 CLR 424. 
 3 Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424, 444–6 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ); Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12. 
 4 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991) 41–4. 
 5 Companies Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict, c 89. This is the legislative ancestor of the modern 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in Australia. Certain provisions in Australian company law can be 
traced back to this legislation. In particular, s 563A dealing with shareholder subordination 
developed out of Companies Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict, c 89, s 38. 
 6 For judicial observation of substantial legal changes relating to corporate responsibility over the 
last century: see Re Pyramid Building Society (in liq) (1991) 6 ACSR 405, 408–9 (Vincent J). 
 7 The Future Fund was established by the Future Fund Act 2006 (Cth) to assist future Australian 
governments to meet the cost of public sector superannuation liabilities by delivering investment 
returns on contributions to the Fund. Total assets, as at August 2007, amounted to $60 billion: 
see Australian Government, Future Fund (2007) <http://www.futurefund.gov.au/>. 
 8 Jeffrey Lucy, ‘ASIC’s Super Strategies: 2006–07’ (Speech delivered to The Association of 
Superannuation Funds of Australia Ltd, Sydney, 6 September 2006) 1. 
 9 Ibid. 
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However, if equity capital markets are to operate efficiently, market investors 
must possess accurate information about the companies traded on the market. 
Indeed, the efficient market hypothesis involves the principle that market prices 
reflect the value of companies based on all of the available information.10 
Therefore, Australian corporate laws have generated a plethora of corporate 
disclosure requirements to ensure that price-sensitive information is released to 
the market in a timely manner and remains accurate. These requirements include 
continuous disclosure11 and transaction-specific disclosure obligations.12 The 
rules formulated in these disclosure laws are enforceable by a range of both 
public and private remedies.13 
However, the creation of private remedies for defective disclosure generates a 
tension with longstanding priority rules in insolvency. Where a company enters 
insolvent administration, the law has a well-established system of priorities that 
favours unsecured creditors over members of the company (that is, sharehold-
ers).14 Members of a company are prohibited from lodging proofs of debt if they 
have outstanding amounts owed to the company.15 Furthermore, s 563A of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) prohibits the payment of debts owed to members, 
in their capacity as members, before creditors’ claims have been fully satisfied. If 
the company is insolvent, it is therefore likely that debts owed to members will 
not be repaid, because an insolvent company is, by definition, unable to satisfy 
all of its creditors’ claims with its assets. 
There is an inherent tension involved in granting investors’ rights to enforce 
proper disclosure practices and compensatory remedies for breach of those 
disclosure requirements on the one hand, with the subordination of debts owed to 
shareholders in insolvency on the other. After all, it is during the company’s 
insolvency that shareholders misled into buying into a failing company by 
inaccurate, or even fraudulent market disclosure practices, will require protection 
as their investments will be lost as a result of the company’s insolvency. 
Several recent decisions have examined the scope of the rules subordinating 
shareholder claims in insolvency. The pinnacle of these developments has been 
the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Sons of Gwalia.16 That case 
decided that shareholders claiming damages for statutory misrepresentation 
which induced their purchase of shares over the secondary market were not owed 
a debt in their ‘capacity as a member’17 and therefore were not subordinated by 
 
 10 Eugene F Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 
Journal of Finance 383, 383. 
 11 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 6CA. 
 12 See, eg, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 6D. 
 13 For public enforcement, ASIC has general administration of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): at 
s 5B. ASIC may seek remedies for breaches of the Act, including injunctions (s 1324), pecuniary 
penalties (s 1317G), compensation orders (ss 1317H, 1317HA) and disqualification orders 
(ss 206C, 206F). For private enforcement: see, eg, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 729 (defec-
tive disclosure documents under ch 6D), 1317H, 1317HA (compensation orders), 1324 (injunc-
tion and/or damages). 
 14 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 556. 
 15 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 553A. 
 16 (2007) 232 ALR 232. 
 17 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 563A. 
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s 563A. This decision allows shareholders of companies that breach corporate 
disclosure requirements to claim status as contingent creditors in corporate 
insolvency. 
The implications of the High Court’s decision in Sons of Gwalia are immense 
and are discussed below in Part IV. While the elevation of the status of 
shareholders to that of unsecured creditors where they have claims in certain 
circumstances for damage caused by defective disclosure practices has been 
welcomed by shareholder groups, it has drawn adverse reactions from other 
sectors of the commercial community.18 Certainly, loud calls have been made in 
the media for law reform that models Australian insolvency law along the lines 
of § 510(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Reform Act19 with its clear emphasis 
on a ‘members come last’ policy. The polarised reaction to Sons of Gwalia, 
together with the strong dissent of Callinan J, further demonstrates that 
parliamentary intention regarding the appropriate delineation between the rights 
of creditors and investors during insolvency remains unclear. This has led to the 
matter being referred to the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 
(‘CAMAC’), which has been asked to consider what should be the appropriate 
balance between investor and creditor rights in insolvency, and will be discussed 
below in Part V. 
The aim of this case note is to examine the High Court’s reasoning in Sons of 
Gwalia and to discuss the possible impact of the decision on Australian corporate 
law. Furthermore, we will comment on the possible future development of the 
law regarding the treatment of shareholder claims in insolvency. However, first it 
is appropriate to discuss briefly the decisions of the lower courts leading to Sons 
of Gwalia, and other related cases, in order to properly contextualise the High 
Court’s decision. 
I I   BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION 
A  The Facts 
The Sons of Gwalia litigation involved a damages claim made by a shareholder 
(Luka Margaretic) of the Sons of Gwalia Ltd gold mining company, a publicly 
listed company on the Australian Stock Exchange (‘ASX’). The damages claim 
was based upon allegedly misleading or deceptive conduct and a failure to 
comply with the company’s continuous disclosure obligations. The relevant 
conduct involved statements made by the company’s management to the ASX 
regarding the level of the company’s gold reserves. The accuracy of this informa-
tion was relevant in the following way. The company had entered into a number 
 
 18 See, eg, Christopher Dalton, Executive Comment: Sons of Gwalia Decision Undermines Clarity 
for Debtholders and Wider Australian Debt Market (7 February 2007) Standard & Poor’s 
<http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/ap/page.hottopic/sons_of_gwalia_viewpoi
nt_2_12_hottopic/3,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0.html>. 
 19 Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 USC § 510(b) (2000 & Supp V, 2005) (‘Bankruptcy Code’). See, eg, 
Australian Bankers’ Association, ‘Australian Bankers’ Association Supports CAMAC Examina-
tion of Sons of Gwalia Ruling’ (Press Release, 8 February 2007). Cf ABC News Online, Share-
holders’ Group Welcomes High Court Win (31 January 2007) ABC News Online 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200701/s1837183.htm>. 
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of gold forward contracts, which required the company to supply gold to various 
parties in the future. However, the price of gold had risen dramatically. This 
would result in the company suffering substantial losses if it had to buy gold on 
market to satisfy its forward gold delivery contracts. The company, with its gold 
reserves being inadequate, found itself in this worst case scenario. The company 
subsequently announced that its statements regarding the gold reserves were 
incorrect. The share price collapsed, with disastrous consequences. The company 
could no longer continue as a going concern, prompting the directors to appoint 
a voluntary administrator. Subsequently, the ASX removed the company’s shares 
from the official trading list, which reduced the value of Margaretic’s share 
investment to zero. 
Margaretic lodged a proof of debt with the company’s administrators, claiming 
that the company’s incorrect statements breached market disclosure laws,20 
including the obligation not to engage in misleading or deceptive conduct,21 and 
had induced him to purchase shares in the company. His compensation claim 
sought to recover the cost of his shares plus brokerage (approximately $20 000). 
Margaretic’s claim was supported by the publicly listed litigation funder, IMF 
Ltd. 
The administrators rejected Margaretic’s proof of debt and sought court decla-
rations in the Federal Court that his claim was either prohibited by the rule in 
Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (‘Houldsworth’),22 or was otherwise 
subordinated by s 563A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Margaretic filed a 
cross-claim seeking a declaration that he was a creditor for the purposes of the 
company’s voluntary administration and was therefore entitled to vote at the 
creditors’ meeting. The administrators’ actions were part of a test case to decide 
on the status of close to 1000 shareholders in a position similar to that of 
Margaretic. The findings of the trial judge and the appeal court in the Sons of 
Gwalia litigation in the Federal Court are outlined below.23 
B  A Short History of the Legal Issue 
The High Court’s decision in Sons of Gwalia is significant because it overturns 
the conventional view that shareholders should not be permitted to prove in a 
winding up in competition with the rights of non-shareholder creditors. This 
view is encapsulated in the rule in Houldsworth which prohibits shareholders 
who have not rescinded their shares and removed themselves from the register of 
members prior to the winding up from proving in a winding up until creditors’ 
claims are fully satisfied.24 The rule in Houldsworth had been accepted in 
Australia for the past 120 years, and was applied in the past by a differently 
constituted High Court in Webb. In that case, the majority of the High Court 
 
 20 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674. 
 21 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041H; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001 (Cth) s 12DA; Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52. 
 22 (1880) 5 App Cas 317. 
 23 See below Part II(B)(2), (4). 
 24 Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15, 31–3 (Mason CJ, Deane, 
Dawson and Toohey JJ) (‘Webb’). 
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ruled that subscribing shareholders involved in the collapse of the Pyramid 
Building Society could not lodge proofs of debt in the company’s liquidation due 
to the equivalent of s 563A, which the Court said embodied the rule in Houlds-
worth.25 
However, in 2004, doubts began to develop among some members of the 
judiciary about the continuing application of Houldsworth in Australia. The 
doubts arose out of obiter comments made by Finkelstein J in Re Media World 
Communications (admin apptd) (‘Media World’),26 where his Honour stated that 
Houldsworth only applied to shareholders who subscribed for shares from the 
company, and did not apply to transferee shareholders who purchased their 
shares over the secondary market. These comments were soon picked up in the 
subsequent Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Ltd (‘Concept 
Sports’)27 class action and ultimately the Sons of Gwalia litigation. 
In order to better appreciate the significance of the High Court’s reasoning in 
Sons of Gwalia, it is appropriate to highlight the case law developments that 
preceded the High Court’s decision. 
1 The Media World Decision 
In this case, the voluntary administrator of the Media World Communications 
technology company sought directions in the Federal Court in relation to 
subscribing shareholders who claimed damages as a result of alleged misrepre-
sentations made by the company in its prospectus. The administrator applied for 
directions that the shareholders were precluded from lodging proofs of debt as a 
result of the rule in Houldsworth.28 Finkelstein J granted declarations that the 
subscribing shareholders were not ‘creditors’ of the company and could not, 
therefore, lodge a proof of debt in the company’s administration.29 The rationale 
for the decision was founded on the rule in Houldsworth which prevents a 
shareholder from seeking damages without first rescinding their shareholdings 
(which is impossible once the company becomes insolvent).30 
Having granted the declaration, Finkelstein J then addressed a further question 
raised by the administrator regarding the status of transferee shareholders. This 
was, of course, strictly obiter given the initial order was already granted, and 
there were in fact no transferee shareholders that had sought to lodge proofs of 
debt. However, his Honour stated that any transferee shareholders that may come 
forward would not fit within the scope of the rule in Houldsworth, and would not 
therefore be prevented from lodging a proof of debt.31 This was based on the fact 
that a transferee shareholder could not rescind their share purchase because their 
contract was not with the company, but with another shareholder. Secondly, the 
rule in Houldsworth is based (at least in part) on the maintenance of capital 
doctrine, and (so stated his Honour) a claim for damages by a transferee share-
 
 25 Ibid 31–6 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
 26 (2005) 216 ALR 105, 111–12. 
 27 (2005) 55 ACSR 145, 151 (Finkelstein J); revd (2005) 147 FCR 434. 
 28 Media World (2005) 216 ALR 105, 107 (Finkelstein J). 
 29 Ibid 107–11. 
 30 Ibid 109–10 (Finkelstein J). 
 31 Ibid 111. 
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holder does not involve a reduction of capital so the company’s creditors are not 
prejudiced. This point drew support from the House of Lords’ decision in 
Soden v British & Commonwealth Holdings plc (‘Soden’),32 where it was held 
that a transferee shareholder is not subordinated under the English equivalent of 
s 563A. 
The decision in Media World created a storm of controversy, with major corpo-
rate debt providers arguing that allowing transferee shareholders to claim as 
unsecured creditors would substantially dilute returns.33 This, they alleged, 
would make unsecured lending more risky and would raise the cost of corporate 
debt in Australia, particularly from US lenders because the US Bankruptcy Code 
strictly subordinates both transferee and subscribing shareholders in insol-
vency.34 The controversy that followed Media World intensified when Margaretic 
succeeded in the Sons of Gwalia case. 
2 Sons of Gwalia Ltd (admin apptd) v Margaretic 
At first instance, Emmett J dismissed the administrators’ application and 
granted the shareholder’s cross-claim.35 This allowed Margaretic to prove (and 
vote) as an unsecured creditor in the company’s voluntary administration. His 
Honour’s reasons were based on his view that the rule in Houldsworth and its 
subsequent application by the High Court in Webb were restricted to cases where 
the shareholder was, in effect, seeking to rescind their contract with the com-
pany.36 As the High Court in Webb had stated that the rule in Houldsworth was 
incorporated into the predecessor of s 563A, the phrase ‘debt owed in his or her 
capacity as a member’ in s 563A was limited to shareholders claiming amounts 
under a direct contract with the company.37 
This interpretation effectively restricted the statutory subordination provision 
to subscribing shareholders purchasing shares through a prospectus. Further-
more, Emmett J considered that a right to damages arising from the breach of 
statutory misrepresentation provisions (such as s 1041H of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth)) is not a ‘debt owed in his or her capacity as a member’, but is rather 
a debt arising because of statutory consumer protection provisions.38 Clearly, in 
his Honour’s view, the Parliament had made a choice to favour investor protec-
tion over established priority rules in insolvency law. This issue was raised in the 
Concept Sports39 class action, which involved an allegedly defective prospectus 
 
 32 [1998] AC 298, 326 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
 33 Luke Bentvelzen, Belinda Bible and Elisabeth McDermott, ‘Media World: Using a Pocket Watch 
in the Digital Age’ (2006) 24 Companies and Securities Law Journal 161, 165.  
 34 Stephen Bartholomeusz, ‘Court Ruling Sends Shock Waves through Global Investment’, The 
Age (Melbourne), 12 February 2005, Business 1; David Clifford and Kenneth Tang, 
‘Over-Reaction to the Media World Case’ (March 2005) Focus 1. 
 35 Sons of Gwalia Ltd (admin apptd) v Margaretic (2005) 55 ACSR 365, 378. 
 36 Ibid 376. 
 37 Ibid 376–7 (Emmett J). 
 38 Ibid. Similar statements were made in obiter in Johnston v McGrath (2005) 195 FLR 101, 112 
(Gzell J). 
 39 (2005) 55 ACSR 145; revd (2005) 147 FCR 434. 
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and was decided at the same time as the original decision in Sons of Gwalia Ltd 
(admin apptd) v Margaretic.40 
3 The Concept Sports Litigation 
In this case, the shareholders claimed damages under ss 728 and 729 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) on the basis of an allegedly defective profit 
forecast contained in the company’s prospectus. The company had failed to reach 
its profit forecasts by a considerable margin and the share price had plunged well 
below the issue price. Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd (through a trustee) 
had sold shares in the company that it had subscribed for through the prospectus 
and claimed, as damages, the difference between the subscription price and the 
sale price. As part of its case, Concept Sports Ltd argued that the shareholders 
could not sue for damages as a result of the rule in Houldsworth. As noted above, 
the rule prohibits a shareholder who has not rescinded their share contract with 
the company from suing for damages for misrepresentation. 
At first instance, Finkelstein J held that the rule in Houldsworth limited the 
scope of ss 728 and 729 and, therefore, the shareholders could not pursue their 
claim.41 This result followed from the fact that Cadence Asset Management Pty 
Ltd had sold their shares and could no longer rescind the contract. This finding 
was consistent with his Honour’s earlier decision in Media World, discussed 
above. 
On appeal, a unanimous decision of the Full Federal Court upheld the appeal 
and refused to limit ss 728 and 729 by the rule in Houldsworth. Their Honours’ 
reasoning on this point was based on the absence of any express incorporation of 
the rule in Houldsworth in the ch 6D fundraising provisions.42 Their Honours 
held that the mischief that Houldsworth sought to avoid — that is, shareholders 
claiming back the company’s capital to the detriment of creditors — was still 
addressed by s 563A.43 Thus, the Court concluded that it should not read down 
the plain words of ss 728 and 729 which allow a claim to be brought against the 
company for misrepresentation inducing the purchase of shares, even where the 
shareholder had not rescinded their share contract with the company. Signifi-
cantly, their Honours did state that s 563A would have subordinated the share-
holder’s claims if Concept Sports had been in liquidation, but the company was 
solvent.44 
Thus, the appeal decision in Concept Sports accepted that s 563A applied to 
subscribing shareholders, but only where the company was in liquidation. Their 
Honours held that the rule in Houldsworth had been modified by ch 6D, which 
allowed subscribing shareholders to claim damages for a defective disclosure 
document even where they had not rescinded their shares. 
 
 40 (2005) 55 ACSR 365. 
 41 Concept Sports (2005) 55 ACSR 145, 150–1. 
 42 Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 434, 446 (Merkel, 
Weinberg and Kenny JJ). 
 43 Ibid 446–7 (Merkel, Weinberg and Kenny JJ). 
 44 Ibid 447 (Merkel, Weinberg and Kenny JJ). 
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4 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic 
The administrators’ appeal from Emmett J’s decision to the Full Federal Court 
was unsuccessful.45 All three judges delivered separate reasons for dismissing 
the appeal, but their reasons were largely consistent, with Finkelstein J’s decision 
being the most detailed. 
All three judges agreed that the High Court’s decision in Webb, and therefore 
its construction of the predecessor of s 563A, only applied to subscribing 
shareholders and not shareholders who bought on market.46 This conclusion was 
supported by the House of Lords’ decision in Soden,47 which distinguished 
between subscribing and transferee shareholders and treated Webb as a decision 
on the former, not the latter.48 
Their Honours also approved of the finding in Soden that a claim for damages 
by a transferee shareholder because of statutory misrepresentation did not 
represent an illegal return of capital.49 Significantly, and consistent with the 
subsequent High Court majority, it was held that such a claim did not fall within 
one of the primary foundations of the rule in Houldsworth.50 
Finkelstein J also adopted the test propounded by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
Soden which is concerned with whether the damages arise out of the statutory 
contract contained in the company’s constitution. Finkelstein J found that where 
the damages arise separately from the statutory contract, it would not be a debt 
owed ‘in the capacity as a member’ and therefore would not be subject to 
s 563A.51 His Honour was fortified in this conclusion by the majority’s statement 
in Webb that the predecessor to s 563A ‘will not prevent claims by members for 
damages flowing from a breach of a contract separate from the contract to 
subscribe for the shares’.52 In this case, Margaretic’s claims for damages arose 
from general misrepresentation and market disclosure provisions and were not 
dependent upon his rights under the corporate constitution. Therefore, his claim 
was not subordinated by s 563A. This reasoning was to be influential in the High 
Court’s decision, discussed below.53 
Finkelstein J was also highly critical of the previous decision of the Full Fed-
eral Court in Concept Sports, on the basis that s 563A could not, as stated by the 
Full Court, modify Houldsworth.54 This was because the subordination provision 
had existed in corporate law statutes relatively unchanged since before the 
 
 45 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2006) 149 FCR 227. 
 46 Ibid 239–40 (Finkelstein J), 243 (Gyles J), 251 (Jacobson J). Cf Johnston v McGrath (2005) 195 
FLR 101, 113 (Gzell J), although Gzell J’s comments are merely obiter. 
 47 Soden [1998] AC 298, 326 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
 48 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2006) 149 FCR 227, 239 (Finkelstein J), 244 (Gyles J), 
253–4 (Jacobson J). 
 49 Ibid 241–3 (Finkelstein J), 244–5 (Gyles J), 254 (Jacobson J). 
 50 Ibid 244–5 (Gyles J), 253–4 (Jacobson J). Whilst Finkelstein J did not expressly state this in his 
reasons, it is submitted that his Honour’s acceptance of this position taken by the House of Lords 
in Soden [1998] AC 298 represents an implicit acceptance that Margaretic’s claim did not in-
volve a reduction of capital: at 239–43. 
 51 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2006) 149 FCR 227, 242–3. 
 52 Webb (1993) 179 CLR 15, 35 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
 53 See below Part III. 
 54 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2006) 149 FCR 227, 238 (Finkelstein J). 
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decision in Houldsworth. The question as to whether Houldsworth continued to 
define shareholder subordination in light of the modern legislative scheme was a 
central issue for the High Court on appeal.55 
A review of the case law thus far demonstrates that the decisions of the Federal 
Court appeared to involve an inconsistent approach to the rule in Houldsworth 
and its subsequent application in Webb, with the Sons of Gwalia litigation 
adopting a broader application compared with Concept Sports. The former 
decisions prohibited a subscribing member from proving in competition with 
general creditors, whilst the latter allowed subscribing members to prove their 
claims under ch 6D. This distinction between subscribing and transferee share-
holders was later abolished by the High Court, for reasons discussed below. 
It is against this legal backdrop of uncertainty on the intersection between 
shareholders’ and creditors’ rights in insolvencies that we now turn to a detailed 
consideration of the High Court’s judgment in Sons of Gwalia, its implications 
for corporate stakeholders, the policy considerations raised, and the need for law 
reform, if any. 
I I I   THE HIGH COURT DECISION 
The High Court dismissed the appeal by a majority of 6:1 with each judge 
giving separate reasons and Callinan J dissenting. The leading majority opinions 
were given by Gleeson CJ and Hayne J, with whom the rest of the majority 
substantially agreed.56 
Both Gleeson CJ and Hayne J allowed the appeal for essentially the same 
reason, namely, that the defective disclosure provisions that Margaretic relied 
upon to lodge his proof of debt were not limited in any way to shareholders. 
Statutory protective provisions such as s 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) are open to any person who suffers loss as a result of misleading or 
deceptive conduct in financial services. Once this point was reached it became 
inevitable that such claims could not be said to create debts in the claimant’s 
capacity ‘as a member’ and, therefore, s 563A had no operation. The point is best 
captured by Hayne J, who stated: 
In the present case, the obligation which Mr Margaretic seeks to enforce is not 
an obligation which the 2001 Act creates in favour of a company’s members. 
The obligation Mr Margaretic seeks to enforce, in so far as it is based in statu-
tory causes of action, is rooted in the company’s contravention of the prohibi-
tion against engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct and the company’s 
liability to suffer an order for damages or other relief at the suit of any person 
who has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss and damage as a result of the con-
travention. In so far as the claim is put forward in the tort of deceit, it is a claim 
that stands altogether apart from any obligation created by the 2001 Act and 
 
 
 55 See below Part III(A). 
 56 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 247 (Gummow J), 268 (Kirby J), 302 (Heydon J), 302–3 
(Crennan J). 
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owed by the company to its members. Those claims are not claims ‘owed by a 
company to a person in the person’s capacity as a member of the company’. 
For these reasons, s 563A does not apply to the claim made by Mr Marga-
retic.57 
Importantly, this finding entailed a rejection of the distinction made in the lower 
courts (and by the House of Lords in Soden) that the subordination provisions 
applied only to subscribing shareholders, not transferee shareholders. The above 
reasoning means that any shareholder (regardless of how their shares were 
purchased) who sought damages as a result of defective market disclosure would 
not be subordinated because their claims were not based upon causes of action 
exclusively available to shareholders (such as rights to payment accruing under 
the statutory contract).58 The majority consistently stated that their task was not 
one of determining whether shareholders should be subordinated or whether 
Houldsworth was right or wrong. Rather, in their view it fell upon them simply 
to determine whether Margaretic’s claimed damages were owed to him in his 
‘capacity as a member’. For the reasons outlined above, the majority held that 
they were not.59 
The majority also addressed several significant points regarding the relation-
ship between shareholders and creditors under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 
which are discussed thematically below. 
A  Should Section 563A Be Limited by Houldsworth? 
The High Court’s decision involved a number of important issues concerning 
the effect of Houldsworth on the proper interpretation of s 563A. 
The majority found that the rule in Houldsworth did not have the same opera-
tion as s 563A. Whilst the rule operates to prohibit claims by members that are 
‘inconsistent’ with their contract of membership, s 563A merely subordinates (or 
defers) the payment of those claims until after the non-member debts are fully 
satisfied. The majority recognised that s 563A operates on the presumption that a 
member is able to lodge a proof of debt even for a debt owed in their capacity as 
a member.60 It is not the fact that the debt is owed to a member that attracts the 
operation of s 563A. Rather, it is the characterisation of the debt as one that is 
owed ‘in the capacity as a member’ that mandates subordination.61 As noted 
above, the majority relied upon the fact that the claims raised by Margaretic were 
not limited to members of the company and therefore did not give rise to ‘debts 
 
 57 Ibid 286 (emphasis in original). See also at 244 (Gleeson CJ). 
 58 See ibid 243 (Gleeson CJ), 248 (Gummow J). Gummow J referred to the distinction between 
claims by subscribing shareholders and claims by transferee shareholders as being a ‘fruitless’ 
one: at 248. Similarly, Gleeson CJ stated that such distinctions involved ‘little difference’: at 
243. 
 59 Ibid 240 (Gleeson CJ), 264 (Kirby J), 269 (Hayne J). Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ all 
agreed with Hayne J on this point: at 259–60 (Gummow J), 302 (Heydon J), 305 (Crennan J). 
 60 Ibid 237 (Gleeson CJ), 247 (Gummow J), 265–6 (Kirby J), 278 (Hayne J), 287 (Callinan J), 302 
(Heydon J). Crennan J did not decide this point specifically, but generally agreed with the rea-
sons given by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ: at 302–3. 
 61 Ibid 236–9 (Gleeson CJ). 
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owed … in [his] capacity as a member’.62 Therefore, the majority refused to 
apply the rule in Houldsworth to the interpretation of s 563A. 
Furthermore, several members of the majority were clearly unimpressed with 
the idea that Houldworth was of continuing relevance to modern Australian 
corporate law. Gleeson CJ stated that the principle underpinning the decision was 
‘elusive’.63 Gummow J specifically rejected the notion of a common law rule 
arising out of Houldsworth that prohibited members claiming for misrepresenta-
tion damages in the company’s liquidation.64 As his Honour said, ‘[n]either the 
“principle” attributed to Houldsworth, nor Houldsworth itself, had anything to do 
with the presently relevant provisions of the Act’.65 This sentiment reflects a 
deep-seated doubt about the majority’s reasoning in Webb, which had found that 
the statutory subordination provision ‘recognised’ the policy of Houldsworth.66 
As Gleeson CJ said, such a statement involves a ‘chronological curiosity’ given 
that the wording of the provision pre-dates Houldsworth.67 Thus, in the major-
ity’s view, the previous decision in Webb did not require the subordination of 
transferee claims by members in insolvency. 
B  The Maintenance of Capital Doctrine 
All members of the Court agreed that the reluctance to allow members to 
compete with general creditors in insolvency was based, at least partly, on the 
maintenance of capital doctrine.68 That longstanding principle prevented 
companies from reducing their capital to the detriment of creditors.69 However, 
the doctrine has been criticised70 and, in recent times, onerous restrictions on 
capital reductions have been relaxed under modern legislation.71 
The majority determined that the maintenance of capital doctrine was not 
infringed by allowing Margaretic’s claims in insolvency. In their Honours’ 
opinion, the misrepresentation damages claim by a transferee member did not 
involve a claim on the company’s capital.72 
 
 62 Ibid 286 (Kirby J). 
 63 Ibid 239. 
 64 Ibid 247–8. His Honour also specifically criticised the ‘inconsistency’ argument raised in 
Houldsworth (1880) 5 App Cas 317 by analysing the history of rescission for misrepresentation: 
at 249–55. 
 65 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 257. 
 66 Webb (1993) 179 CLR 15, 31–3 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
 67 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 239. See also at 257, 260 (Gummow J), largely approved 
by Kirby J: at 262. Hayne J was not prepared to directly criticise the reasoning in Webb, but 
distinguished the decision on the basis that it concerned subscribing members: at 281–2. Hey-
don J agreed with Hayne J: at 302. 
 68 Ibid 236 (Gleeson CJ), 279, 281 (Hayne J), 295 (Callinan J). 
 69 See the discussion in R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (13th 
ed, 2007) 1289–91. 
 70 See ibid 1289, where the learned authors refer to the principle as ‘defective’ as a measure of 
creditor protection. See also John Armour, ‘Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?’ (2006) 7 
European Business Organization Law Review 5, 5. 
 71 Cf Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 2J with the stricter statutory equivalent in Corporations Act 
1989 (Cth) s 195, prior to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program reforms of 1998 to 
share capital transactions. 
 72 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 243 (Gleeson CJ), 262 (Kirby J), 281 (Hayne J), 305 
(Crennan J). 
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Some members of the majority also doubted that the maintenance of capital 
doctrine reflected the value of modern corporations or was indeed even neces-
sary for the protection of creditors.73 This may be contrasted with the approach 
taken by Callinan J who placed great emphasis (albeit in dissent) on the protec-
tion of the company’s paid-up capital. His Honour noted ‘the continuing impor-
tance, relevance, indeed sanctity, of the capital, as opposed to any clearly 
ascertainable profits generated by it.’74 
C  The Role of Investor Protection Laws 
Of the seven judges, three (Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Callinan JJ) paid attention 
to the modern trend towards enhanced investor protection in the contemporary 
Australian corporate landscape and the competing policy issues arising from the 
treatment of shareholder and creditor claims in insolvency.75 The judgment of 
Gleeson CJ recognised the intersection between the rights of shareholders and 
creditors in insolvency and observed that modern legislation 
has extended greatly the scope for ‘shareholder claims’ against corporations, 
with consequences for ordinary creditors who may find themselves, in an 
insolvency, proving in competition with members now armed with statutory 
rights.76 
More significantly, Gleeson CJ was alive to the resultant policy issues and the 
tensions that were caused by such competing interests, but was content to leave it 
to Parliament to resolve the following issues identified by his Honour: 
On the one hand, extending the range of claims by shareholders is likely to be 
at the expense of ordinary creditors. The spectre of insolvency stands behind 
corporate regulation. Legislation that confers rights of damages upon 
shareholders necessarily increases the number of potential creditors in a 
winding up. Such an increase normally will be at the expense of those who 
previously would have shared in the available assets. On the other hand, since 
the need for protection of investors often arises only in the event of insolvency, 
such protection may be illusory if the claims of those who are given the 
apparent benefit of the protection are subordinated to the claims of ordinary 
creditors.77 
As the passage above demonstrates, Gleeson CJ saw the need for legislative 
clarification regarding where the line should be drawn to accommodate 
competing shareholder and creditor interests in insolvencies. In his Honour’s 
view, s 563A did not provide for a policy of blanket subordination where all 
member claims must be deferred to non-member creditors in insolvency. 
Furthermore, if Australia were to adopt a model of blanket subordination similar 
 
 73 Ibid 236 (Gleeson CJ). Crennan J doubted that Houldsworth (1880) 5 App Cas 317 supported the 
notion that the shareholder’s claim should be subordinated so as to preserve a guarantee fund for 
the creditors. Her Honour stated that the decision merely acted to clarify the rights between 
members (as Houldsworth involved an unlimited company): at 303–5. 
 74 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 295. 
 75 Ibid 262 (Kirby J). See generally at 286–301 (Callinan J). 
 76 Ibid 240. 
 77 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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to the US position,78 Parliament would need to consider what the practical effect 
would be upon the rights conferred on investors in circumstances similar to those 
of Margaretic.79 
The ink in the judgment was barely dry before the policy concerns flagged by 
Gleeson CJ were addressed by the federal government. Indeed, within a week of 
the High Court’s decision the matter was referred to the CAMAC for 
‘consideration and advice’.80 
Kirby J, in agreement with Gleeson CJ, also concluded that s 563A does not 
evidence any intention of adopting a ‘members come last’ policy (discussed 
further below). In support of his decision, Kirby J drew specific attention to the 
policy aim, rather than merely the content or operation, of the continuous 
disclosure laws under s 674 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). According to his 
Honour, one of the principal reasons for the establishment of such a law 
was the provision of protection, in circumstances such as arose in 
[Margaretic’s] case, to persons like him. The obligation of continuous 
disclosure … was specifically designed and enacted to protect shareholders and 
potential shareholders from losses that might be suffered from undisclosed 
facts and to afford a foundation that would prevent, compensate for and reduce 
the incidence of such losses.81 
Similarly, his Honour offered a rationale for the federal Parliament to offer 
shareholders a remedy for misleading or deceptive conduct. Kirby J held that 
such new remedies are ‘designed, ultimately, to improve the protection of (and 
remedies available to) Australian shareholders’.82 
Therefore, it may be said that the majority’s decision reinforces the investor 
protection regime operating under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in times 
when protection measures are needed most — in insolvency. Where this might 
operate to reduce the return to non-member creditors, the majority’s view 
(particularly that of Gleeson CJ and Kirby J) was that Parliament had acted to 
protect investors’ interests, even at the expense of contract creditors. 
D  Policy Issues 
In discussing policy issues involved with the allocation of risk between 
shareholders and creditors, and the priorities between them upon insolvency, 
Kirby J was sympathetic to the position of creditors and favoured subordination. 
 
 78 Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC § 510(b) (2000 & Supp V, 2005) provides for a ‘members come last’ 
policy by subordinating all claims for damages by shareholders arising from the purchase or sale 
of securities. For further discussion of subordination in the US: see Anil Hargovan and Jason 
Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and Statutory Debt Subordination: An Appraisal of the North American 
Experience’ (2007) 20 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 265. 
 79 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 240 (Gleeson CJ). 
 80 Chris Pearce, Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, ‘Pearce Asks CAMAC to Examine the 
Sons of Gwalia Ruling’ (Press Release, 7 February 2007). In this press release, the Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Treasurer announced the referral of issues arising from the High Court decision 
in Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232 to CAMAC for ‘consideration and advice’ on the need 
for law reform. The three issues that CAMAC has been requested to examine can be found in the 
press release. 
 81 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 262. 
 82 Ibid. 
     
2007] Case Notes 605 
     
However, his Honour ultimately felt constrained, on the basis of statutory 
interpretation of s 563A, to find in favour of Margaretic’s claim. 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, his Honour openly declared his finding to be 
counter-intuitive and queried whether the outcome of his judgment was 
surprising.83 
This rather unorthodox approach was prompted by the speculative answer to 
an issue raised by his Honour, namely, what is the presumed — as opposed to the 
actual — general policy of the Corporations Act? If one were to approach the 
meaning of s 563A based on a presumed general policy of ‘members come last’ 
in an insolvency due to the inherent risks undertaken by a investor, Kirby J 
opined that it would be unsurprising if both a textual and contextual analysis of 
the Act favoured subordination of Margaretic’s claim.84 This view was expressed 
after his Honour distinguished between the different (and unequal) risks 
undertaken by creditors compared with investors. For such reasons, it was 
readily apparent to his Honour that strong policy arguments could be mounted 
for Margaretic’s claim to be postponed to claims made by the general creditors of 
the insolvent company.85 
Standing in the shoes of general creditors, for the purposes of this hypothetical, 
Kirby J offered the following likely inferential response to the concern that an 
investor was a victim of misleading and deceptive conduct and therefore 
deserving of protection in insolvency: 
‘By purchasing your shares in a gold mining venture, you engaged in an 
inescapably risky and speculative operation. Now you claim to have been 
deceived. But that kind of risk is one that is inherent in the very acquisition of 
shares in a company by which you become a member of it. You can make your 
claim for deception; but it ranks after the general creditors have recovered their 
proved losses. Your claim or “debt”, if owed at all, is owed to you in your 
capacity as a member of the company’.86 
Despite adopting a nuanced approach to s 563A and allowing Margaretic’s 
claim, by rejecting the view that s 563A is premised on a ‘members come last’ 
policy, it appears that Kirby J has foreshadowed the prospect of law reform. His 
Honour went so far as to offer a possible amendment to redress the imbalance 
between shareholder and creditor rights in insolvency should Parliament think 
that a wrong balance was struck by the majority judgment. His Honour proposed 
that the phrase ‘a debt owed by a company to a person in the person’s capacity as 
a member of the company’ be changed to ‘a debt owed by a company to a person 
who is a member of the company’.87 
Callinan J, in dissent, was prepared to allow Margaretic to prove in the 
administration of Sons of Gwalia Ltd as a creditor but, contrary to the majority’s 
position, not on par with the other unsecured creditors. Callinan J was 
unimpressed with this outcome, principally on the grounds that the majority’s 
 
 83 Ibid 261. 
 84 Ibid 263. 
 85 Ibid 261–2. 
 86 Ibid. 
 87 Ibid 267. 
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construction of s 563A, and their decision, did not promote legal coherence or 
fairness as between the ex ante bargaining position of shareholders and 
creditors.88 
Of the seven judges, only Callinan J placed principal emphasis on existing 
shareholders’ rights and set out to chart the ‘ample and superior statutory rights’ 
enjoyed by shareholders to demonstrate the advantages they have over 
creditors.89 For example, shareholders have the right to receive information from 
the company, attend and vote at company meetings, vote for or against directors, 
and take action against the company for oppression or against the directors under 
a statutory derivative action. 
Callinan J, in a manner consistent with some aspects of Kirby J’s analysis, 
gave attention to the inherent risks of investing in securities. His Honour also 
drew support for his view regarding the policy of s 563A from the maintenance 
of capital provisions in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).90 
On the basis of these considerations, Callinan J concluded that to uphold 
Margaretic’s claim would ‘sit uncomfortably’ with the notion that s 563A gives 
shareholders equal billing with other unsecured creditors upon insolvency.91 
Of course, the majority (particularly Gleeson CJ and Hayne J) responded by 
finding that s 563A was not giving ‘shareholders’ equal billing at all. On the 
contrary, Margaretic was not claiming in his capacity as a shareholder, but rather 
as a market participant with statutory rights to damages for improper disclosure 
practices. As Gleeson CJ said: 
His claim would have been the same if he had sold his shares (for example, to 
crystallise his loss for tax purposes) before he made the claim, or if for some 
reason his name had never been entered on the company’s register of mem-
bers.92 
The appellants accepted in this case that s 563A would not have applied had 
Margaretic been able to sell his shares before he made his claim.93 It is difficult 
to characterise the claim as being one owed to him ‘in his capacity as a member’ 
if membership is not an essential requirement for bringing the action. 
E  Alternative Legislative Models 
Although not determinative in any way of the law as it stands in Australia, it is 
useful to consider and compare legislative models on debt subordination rules in 
other jurisdictions with a similar economic and statutory framework, to ascertain 
the manner in which the allocation of risk between shareholders and creditors 
and the priorities between them upon insolvency, have been apportioned. In 
common with Australia, the US, Canada and the United Kingdom have 
disclosure laws designed for shareholder protection with the right to sanctions 
 
 88 Ibid 300–1. 
 89 Ibid 295. 
 90 See above Part III(B). 
 91 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 295. 
 92 Ibid 238. 
 93 Ibid 237–8 (Gleeson CJ). 
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for inadequate disclosure of price-sensitive information to the market. Each of 
those jurisdictions also has statutory or common law rules subordinating 
shareholder claims in insolvency.94 
Of the seven High Court judges, three considered differing legislative schemes 
with reference to the experience in the US95 and the UK.96 Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ focused on the US Bankruptcy Code97 which eschews 
shareholder claims in bankruptcy. This provision, which is underpinned by 
policy considerations favouring blanket subordination of shareholder claims for 
damages in circumstances similar to those of Margaretic, states that: 
a claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor 
or of an affiliate of the debtor, [or] for damages arising from the purchase or 
sale of such a security … shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are 
senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security, except that 
if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common 
stock.98 
Gummow J examined the rationale for this legislative provision, gleaned from 
consideration of the legal principles underpinning the leading decision in Re 
Telegroup Inc (‘Telegroup’),99 delivered by the US Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit.100 His Honour noted that Congress adjudged that shareholders 
should bear the risk of illegality in the issue of shares over general unsecured 
creditors should the company enter bankruptcy. According to Telegroup, it is 
impermissible for disappointed shareholders to use fraud and other claims ‘to 
 
 94 The US has the strongest current subordination laws in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC § 510(b) 
(2000 & Supp V, 2005). For discussion: see Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and Statutory 
Debt Subordination’, above n 78. Canada has proposed amendments to its insolvency legislation 
to introduce even stronger subordination laws by deferring all ‘equity claims’ in insolvency, 
including preventing shareholder claimants from voting at creditors’ meetings: see Bill C-55, An 
Act to Establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to Amend the Bankruptcy and Insol-
vency Act and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and to Make Consequential Amend-
ments to Other Acts, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (assented to 25 November 2005, c 47). At the time 
of writing, Bill C-55 had been passed by the Canadian federal Parliament but not proclaimed: 
see Legisinfo, Status of Bill C-55 (25 July 2007) Parliament of Canada 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&Chamber=N&StartList=A&EndLi
st=Z&Session=13&Type=0&Scope=I&query=4514&List=stat>. On the other hand, whilst the 
UK has a provision substantially similar to Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 563A, Insolvency Act 
1986 (UK) c 45, s 74(2)(f) was read down by the House of Lords in Soden [1998] AC 298, 324 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson), in light of the statutory abolition of the rule in Houldsworth (1880) 5 
App Cas 317 by Companies Act 2006 (UK) c 46, s 655. See also Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of 
Gwalia and Statutory Debt Subordination’, above n 78; Anil Hargovan and Jason Harris, ‘Sons 
of Gwalia: Policy Issues Raised by the Subordination of Shareholder Claims’ (2006) 7(7) Insol-
vency Law Bulletin 1. 
 95 For a comprehensive and critical review of the experience in the US and Canada: see Hargovan 
and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and Statutory Debt Subordination’, above n 78. 
 96 Paul L Davies, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (6th ed, 1997) 435–42; Roy Goode, 
Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd ed, 2005) 198–200. 
 97 11 USC § 510(b) (2000 & Supp V, 2005); Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 240 
(Gleeson CJ), 245–6 (Gummow J), 267 (Kirby J). 
 98 Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC § 510(b) (2000 & Supp V, 2005). 
 99 281 F 3d 133 (3rd Cir, 2002). 
100 See further Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and Statutory Debt Subordination’, 
above n 78, for discussion of Telegroup, 281 F 3d 133 (3rd Cir, 2002), and other leading US 
cases. 
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bootstrap their way to parity with general unsecured creditors’.101 In reliance 
upon the seminal article written by law professors John J Slain and Homer 
Kripke,102 the Court in Telegroup accepted the proposition that ‘because equity 
owners stand to gain the most when a business succeeds, they should absorb the 
costs of the business’s collapse — up to the full amount of their investment.’103 
Relying on another US academic, Gummow J found that § 510(b) ‘effectively 
precludes an equity holder with a securities fraud claim from recovering 
damages from the debtor’s estate for that claim.’104 
After reviewing the wording of s 563A, Gummow J concluded that Australian 
law did not manifest any clear legislative policy seen in the modern legislation in 
the US, nor did it evidence any close legislative consideration of the ends sought 
to be achieved.105 
Similarly, Gleeson CJ contrasted the clear legislative policy of the US with the 
absence of such clarity in the equivalent Australian provision and, without 
hesitation, concluded that s 563A 
does not embody a general policy that, in an insolvency, ‘members come last’. 
On the contrary, by distinguishing between debts owed to a member in the 
capacity as a member and debts owed to a member otherwise than in such a 
capacity, it rejects such a general policy. If there ought to be such a rule, it is 
not to be found in s 563A.106 
Kirby J was persuaded by this argument and endorsed the reasoning of Gleeson 
CJ and Gummow J on this issue. In rejecting a wider interpretation of s 563A, 
Kirby J107 was also influenced by the fact that Parliament did not choose to copy 
a form of drafting that embodied the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.108 
Gummow and Kirby JJ also went further, in varying degrees, by reflecting on 
the contrasting legislative position in the UK.109 Section 111A of the Companies 
Act 1985 (UK) c 6, in direct contrast to the US position, rejects a policy of 
blanket subordination by providing that: 
A person is not debarred from obtaining damages or other compensation from a 
company by reason only of his holding or having held shares in the company or 
any right to apply or subscribe for shares or to be included in the company’s 
register in respect of shares.110 
 
101 Telegroup, 281 F 3d 133, 142 (Becker CJ) (3rd Cir, 2002). 
102 John J Slain and Homer Kripke, ‘The Interface between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy 
— Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance between Securityholders and the Issuer’s 
Creditors’ (1973) 48 New York University Law Review 261. 
103 Telegroup, 281 F 3d 133, 140 (Becker CJ) (3rd Cir, 2002). 
104 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 246. See also Zack Christensen, ‘The Fair Funds for 
Investors Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: Is It Unfair to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?’ 
[2005] University of Illinois Law Review 339, 348–9. 
105 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 246–7. 
106 Ibid 240–1. 
107 Ibid 267. 
108 11 USC § 510(b) (2000 & Supp V, 2005). 
109 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 246 (Gummow J), 266–7 (Kirby J). 
110 Companies Act 1985 (UK) c 6, s 111A. 
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A review of these competing models of statutory debt subordination in the US 
and the UK fortified the conclusions reached by Gummow and Kirby JJ that 
s 563A was intended to effect only a limited subordination of shareholder claims. 
Hayne J, delivering the leading judgment, came to the same conclusion but did 
not see much value in considering other forms of statutory scheme.111 Heydon 
and Crennan JJ, in endorsing the judgment of Hayne J, said nothing about the 
broader issue of comparative legislative models and the allocation of risk 
between shareholders and creditors. Callinan J addressed the latter but not the 
former issue. 
IV  IMPLICATIONS 
The impact of Sons of Gwalia is potentially very significant.112 The decision 
clears the way for all shareholders to claim in corporate insolvencies by relying 
upon general statutory market disclosure and misrepresentation provisions. At a 
minimum, the decision demands law reform to address efficiency implications 
on the processing of claims in insolvency. The High Court’s elevation of 
shareholder claims against an insolvent company so that they rank equally with 
unsecured creditors may impact adversely on the efficient handling of damages 
claims for two significant reasons. 
First, the practical difficulties facing insolvency administrators as a conse-
quence of the Sons of Gwalia decision are unlike any difficulties that are 
currently raised by contingent creditors claiming damages for misrepresentation 
unrelated to share purchases. The reason is that Sons of Gwalia recognises that 
all shareholders who allegedly suffer loss as a result of the company’s defective 
disclosure practices may be permitted to lodge a proof of debt. Whilst usual 
misrepresentation claims typically involve individual business claimants, 
shareholder misrepresentation claims may involve thousands of claimants. The 
administrators’ experience of mass shareholder claims in Sons of Gwalia Ltd 
(5304 shareholders asserting aggregate damages of $242 million)113 and in ION 
Ltd (3000 proofs of debt in excess of $110 million lodged by shareholders)114 is 
testament to such developments impacting on the efficient administration of the 
insolvency regime. The resultant delays and expense offends one of the key 
goals of an effective insolvency system.115 
As a result, without law reform addressing procedural issues, Sons of Gwalia is 
likely to hinder the ability of external administrations to process claims against 
the company efficiently and hamper the smooth administration of our insolvency 
laws with the least possible delay and expense.116 Even in the absence of future 
reform of s 563A, it is submitted that the impact of Sons of Gwalia requires a 
 
111 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 284. 
112 This Part draws on the authors’ earlier article: see Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and 
Statutory Debt Subordination’, above n 78. 
113 Ferrier Hodgson, Report to Creditors: Sons of Gwalia Limited (24 November 2006) 11. 
114 McGrathNicol, Deed Administrators’ Update (15 March 2007) 5–6. 
115 Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No 45 (1988) vol 1, 15. 
116 Elisabeth Sexton, ‘Gwalia Ruling to Delay Ion Payouts’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
2 February 2007, 19. 
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better framework for dealing with mass contingent claims in insolvency. The 
present law, which requires proof of causation and damage, is ill suited to the 
task of efficiently managing thousands of contingent claims that have not been 
confirmed by a court judgment.117 Under current law and practice, which 
requires proof of causation in mass securities litigation,118 liquidators and 
administrators will have to assess each shareholder claim individually, adding to 
the length and cost of external administration.119 
Secondly, some commentators have raised the threat of the floodgates opening 
up for mass shareholder claims in insolvency.120 This prospect arises because 
shareholders, as contingent creditors, do not actually have to prove their claim in 
order to take part in the distribution. Contingent creditors merely have to 
estimate the value of the claim and submit a proof of debt. It is therefore claimed 
that the modern phenomenon and growth of litigation funding in Australia may 
influence the growth of mass shareholder class actions.121 In situations where the 
insolvent company has substantial assets, the shareholders are likely to be 
backed by professional litigation funders who are entitled to control litigation on 
behalf of the shareholders.122 
Of course, insolvency administrators may deny all or part of the shareholder 
claims, but they must first consider each of the claims and may then face strong 
resistance (in the form of court appeals)123 from shareholders who would 
otherwise have nothing to lose given the worthless value of their shares in 
insolvency. If successful in their claims, mass shareholder actions have the 
potential to dilute the assets available for distribution to other non-shareholder 
creditors. This prospect was recognised by Callinan J, perhaps in a more 
 
117 This was recognised by John Walker, writing before the High Court judgment: John Walker, 
‘Sons of Gwalia: Shareholders as Creditors’ (2005) 17 Australian Insolvency Journal 4. 
118 In contrast with the Australian position, shareholders in the US benefit from the ‘fraud on the 
market’ theory of presumed reliance. The US Supreme Court in Basic Inc v Levinson, 485 US 
224, 241–2 (Blackmun J) (1988), accepted and explained the ‘fraud on the market’ theory in the 
following way: 
[it] is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a 
company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company 
and its business … Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if 
the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. … The causal connection between 
the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant 
than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations. 
  Judicial acceptance of the theory was based on ‘fairness, public policy … as well as judicial 
economy’ resulting from a rebuttable presumption of reliance: at 245 (Blackmun J). The ‘fraud 
on the market’ theory is examined in Michael Duffy, ‘Fraud on the Market: Judicial Approaches 
to Causation and Loss from Securities Nondisclosure in the United States, Canada and Australia’ 
(2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 621. 
119 In the Ion administration, the deed administrator has noted that he will need to conduct officer 
examinations in order to verify the facts alleged in the shareholder claims: see McGrathNicol, 
above n 114, 7. 
120 See, eg, Rebecca Keenan, ‘High Court Hands Big Victory to Sons of Gwalia Investors’, The 
West Australian (Perth), 1 February 2007, Metro 1. 
121 Cf Bernard Murphy and Camille Cameron, ‘Access to Justice and the Evolution of Class Action 
Litigation in Australia’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 399, 410–11: ‘A realistic 
appraisal of the evolution of class actions since 1990 strongly suggests that there has been no 
flood of litigation in Australia … the ALRC [2000] has confirmed that [such] concerns … have 
not materialised.’ 
122 See Campbells Cash & Carry Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 58. 
123 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1321. 
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dramatic way, when his Honour warned of claims by a large body of sharehold-
ers diluting the creditors’ rights ‘to less than a trickle.’124 
We submit that it is premature to judge whether the recurring fears concerning 
the opening of the litigation floodgates are justifiable. However, in our opinion, 
the following factors mitigate the floodgate concern. Litigation funders are 
unlikely to commit to cases which are trivial or have little prospect of success. 
Furthermore, unlike the US, the ‘costs follow the event’ rule in Australia and the 
vast expense of conducting a class action will act as disincentives to pursuing 
unmeritorious claims.125 Such structural differences between civil litigation 
practices in the US and Australia make it unlikely that Australia would experi-
ence mass class action litigation on the scale and magnitude observed in the US. 
Furthermore, the decision is unlikely to be relevant to the vast majority of 
companies for two key reasons. First, many corporate insolvencies occur for 
commercial reasons simply as a result of the business risk that faced the 
insolvent corporations, unaccompanied by deceptive practices. Sons of Gwalia 
has no impact on such ‘innocent’ corporate failures. The decision does not 
provide a general safety net for shareholder loss occasioned by investment risk. 
Secondly, the High Court’s refusal to subordinate shareholder claims depended 
upon the statutory market disclosure and misrepresentation provisions in the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). It is worth remembering that one of these 
legislative provisions, dealing with continuous disclosure, only applies to 
disclosing entities (mainly listed public companies).126 Fortunately, compared 
with the incidence of insolvencies experienced by proprietary companies, it is 
relatively rare for these large publicly listed companies to go into insolvency 
(HIH Ltd and One Tel Ltd being notable exceptions).127 Even if publicly listed 
companies were to become insolvent with increasing frequency, shareholder 
claims would only be valuable if the company had substantial unsecured assets. 
If a company had all of its assets secured to the full value of the secured loan, the 
company’s general creditors (including shareholders such as Margaretic) would 
receive nothing. In such circumstances, there would be little, or no, incentive for 
collective enforcement action against the company by litigation funders. 
 Although provisions dealing with misleading or deceptive conduct in financial 
services, such as Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041H and Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12DA, could be used against 
proprietary companies, again, it may not be worth shareholders claiming unless 
the company has substantial unsecured assets. It should be noted that controlling 
shareholders of proprietary companies may have difficulty establishing a cause 
of action for misrepresentation given that they are likely to have been involved 
 
124 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 301. 
125 Murphy and Cameron, above n 121, 409. 
126 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674. 
127 For example, in 2004 there were 16 376 companies in some form of external administration 
(with many of those companies moving from one type to another). Of those companies only 616 
were public companies. Given that the ASX list contains approximately 1700 companies, it is a 
reasonable assumption that publicly listed companies are only a small proportion of the total 
corporate insolvencies. The data used for these calculations was purchased from ASIC as part of 
an empirical study currently being undertaken by the authors. 
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in the process leading up to the information being disclosed. This reduces the 
pool of claimants to minority shareholders, but in a proprietary company there is 
likely to be only a small number of those aside from employees.128 Furthermore, 
both employee shareholders and any significant shareholders of proprietary 
companies who have been misled may prefer to refrain from pursuing their 
misrepresentation claims and pressure the company’s directors to put the 
company into a voluntary administration.129 This is to facilitate a restructuring 
deed of company arrangement in order to save the business. 
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly for the floodgates argument, the 
commercial reality is that litigation funders are unlikely to support shareholder 
claims against proprietary companies because of the small numbers of 
shareholders involved. 
Thus, situations where the High Court’s decision may potentially cause 
substantial adverse effects are effectively limited to a small number of public 
companies. Based on the discussion above, those limited circumstances will 
require large, dispersed numbers of shareholders with holdings in public 
companies with substantial unsecured assets. Stripped of the hype and hysteria 
generated in the press by the Sons of Gwalia decision, it is legitimate to query 
whether the frequency and magnitude of shareholders’ claims will have a 
revolutionary effect in Australian corporate law in the circumstances described. 
Aside from the impact of the decision on insolvency administrators, the ruling 
may have potentially adverse effects for Australian debt capital markets, specifi-
cally the pricing of corporate debt.130 The Australian Bankers’ Association has 
warned that lenders, including domestic banks and offshore providers of credit, 
could either reduce or decline loans or increase credit margins at the cost of 
borrowers.131 Evidence of early research on the impact of the Sons of Gwalia 
litigation suggests that the credit spread on unsecured debt for Australian 
companies could increase substantially.132 Only data and evidence over time, 
however, will tell if such findings and concerns are sustainable and distinguish-
able from the situation in the UK. The removal of Houldsworth does not seem to 
have affected investment in the corporate debt market in that country.133 Mean-
 
128 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 113(1) requires proprietary companies to have no more than 50 
non-employee shareholders. 
129 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 436A. 
130 See Greg Peel and Chris Shaw, ‘Sons of Gwalia: A Frightening Decision’ (2005) 78 Australasian 
Investment Review 20; William Ryback, ‘Aussie Miner Ruling Fuels Fear’ (20 September 2005) 
The Standard <http://www.thestandard.hk/news_print.asp?art_id=1685&sid=4647845>; Elisa-
beth Sexton, ‘Shareholders Move Up Queue’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 1 February 
2007, 23; Leon Zwier and Justin Vaatstra, ‘Implications of the High Court Decision in Sons of 
Gwalia’ (2007) ABL Article 1. 
131 See, eg, Australian Bankers’ Association, ‘Sons of Gwalia Decision’ (Press Release, 2 February 
2007). 
132 Christine Brown and Kevin Davis, ‘Credit Markets and the Sons of Gwalia Judgement’ (2006) 
13 Agenda 239, 249–50. 
133 David Clifford and Gareth Lewis, ‘The Sons of Gwalia Decision: A Lender’s Perspective’ 
(October 2005) Focus 1. Of course, we should not assume that the capital markets in the UK are 
identical to those that operate in Australia. Therefore, the lack of an adverse reaction to remov-
ing subordination in the UK does not necessarily translate to a similar reaction on Australian 
debt capital markets. 
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while, at least one major credit rating agency does not expect Sons of Gwalia to 
have any major impact on Australian debt markets in the short term.134 
V  COMMENTARY 
The High Court, perhaps unintentionally given that all seven judges adopted 
differing approaches, has articulated a policy of limited shareholder subordina-
tion based on extant law. In jettisoning the rule in Houldsworth and respecting 
the statutory consumer protection provisions in Sons of Gwalia, albeit based 
primarily on the rationale of statutory interpretation, the High Court has tele-
graphed the evolution of the law on shareholder subordination. 
Notwithstanding these observations, Sons of Gwalia has generated a remark-
able degree of heat and has been generally branded as revolutionary. We disagree 
if, by revolution, it is meant the unauthorised making of new law through 
disrespect of Parliament’s will. Instead, we see the result as part of the substan-
tial evolution in statutory law, in particular, relating to investor protection and 
remedies for wrongdoing. However, before substantiating this view, we turn our 
attention to the policy considerations underpinning subordination issues, 
followed by recommendations as to the way forward for future law reform. 
A  Observations on Law and Policy 
The corporate insolvency provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) are 
arguably the most important provisions of the Act and the most important set of 
laws governing the corporate sector.135 This is because the cost of capital for 
corporations is determined in the shadow of the risk of insolvency, and the 
distributional rights and priorities that flow out of the formal insolvency process. 
The formulation of priority rules in insolvency, and indeed the specific share-
holder subordination provisions, are as old as the first modern corporate law 
statute in 1862.136 They were therefore created long before the modern trend of 
investor protection and mandatory market disclosure laws. Despite its long 
heritage, it is surprising that there has been a dearth of judicial authority 
discussing the rationale of s 563A prior to the High Court’s judgment in Sons of 
Gwalia. 
Although Sons of Gwalia was decided on grounds of statutory interpretation, 
that did not prevent three of the High Court judges (Gleeson CJ, Kirby and 
Callinan JJ) straying into areas of policy considerations on statutory debt 
subordination. Both Kirby and Callinan JJ engaged in similar analysis, with 
Kirby J’s judgment appearing to be more in sympathy with Callinan J’s than with 
the other members of the majority. 
 
134 Fitch Ratings, Gwalia Shareholder Case Decision Unwelcome for Debt Markets: But No Major 
Impact Likely (1 February 2007) Fitch Ratings <http://www.fitchratings.com.au/show_featart. 
asp?rel_id=464>. 
135 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, 
Improving Australia’s Corporate Insolvency Laws: Issue Paper (2003) 2. 
136 Companies Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict, c 89, s 38. The subsequent history of this provision is 
discussed at length in Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 272–6 (Hayne J). 
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Sons of Gwalia highlights the inherent tension that arises from the conflict 
between a misled shareholder seeking damages in circumstances similar to those 
of Margaretic and the claims of unsecured contract creditors against insolvent 
companies. Some of the High Court judgments, either expressly or implicitly, 
raise policy questions regarding the optimal risk allocation between shareholders 
and creditors in insolvency. The juxtaposition of the competing views expressed 
in Sons of Gwalia, in particular by Callinan J and Gleeson CJ described below, 
goes to the heart of the debate on whether insolvency law should mandate a 
blanket shareholder subordination of securities law claims. 
Callinan J, in dissent, argued unequivocally that the ample and superior rights 
enjoyed by shareholders preclude them from sharing on par with unsecured 
creditors in insolvencies. His Honour’s objections rested principally on the fact 
that shareholders enjoy ‘statutorily mandated limited liability … and their rights 
to participate in the bounty of any [corporate] successes’.137 Such an approach 
echoes the arguments advanced by Slain and Kripke, the architects of blanket 
subordination in the US who also saw no obvious reason for reallocating the risk 
to corporate insolvency from shareholders.138 Slain and Kripke argued that 
shareholders, as investors, should justifiably bear the risk of fraudulent or 
misleading conduct in relation to securities as they had the most to gain from the 
company’s success.139 This policy position was also recognised in the inferential 
response given by Kirby J, on behalf of general creditors discussed earlier, to the 
shareholder victim of misleading and deceptive conduct.140 
Such judicial remarks by Callinan and Kirby JJ go to the core of Slain and 
Kripke’s thesis.141 It reflects a policy: 
to prevent disappointed shareholders from recovering the value of their 
investment by filing bankruptcy claims predicated on the issuer’s unlawful 
conduct at the time of issuance, when the shareholders assumed the risk of 
business failure by investing in equity rather than debt instruments.142 
In contrast, Gleeson CJ presented an alternate framework for analysis which 
represents the opposite of the views espoused by Callinan J. The Chief Justice 
neatly captured the counter-argument to blanket shareholder subordination with 
the following observation: 
On the other hand, since the need for the protection of investors often arises 
only in the event of insolvency, such protection may be illusory if the claims of 
those who are given the apparent benefit of the protection are subordinated to 
the claims of ordinary creditors.143 
Significantly, the concern expressed by Gleeson CJ is similar to those expressed 
two decades earlier by Kenneth B Davis, a trenchant critic of the policy of 
 
137 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 295. 
138 Slain and Kripke, above n 102, 287. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 263. 
141 See Slain and Kripke, above n 102, 267–8. 
142 Telegroup, 281 F 3d 133, 140–1 (Becker CJ) (3rd Cir, 2002), noted in Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 
ALR 232, 246 (Gummow J). 
143 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 240. 
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blanket shareholder subordination in the US. Davis also argues that it is in 
insolvency cases in which fraud is likely to be the most acute and the resultant 
losses to shareholders the greatest.144 
The juxtaposition of these competing views in Sons of Gwalia goes to the heart 
of the debate on whether insolvency law should mandate a blanket shareholder 
subordination of securities law claims. If not, where should the line be drawn in 
the delineation of shareholder and creditor rights in insolvencies? The discussion 
below comments on these issues. 
B  The Way Forward 
The way forward is for Parliament to heed the cry for certainty by clearly 
articulating a legislative policy which addresses the competing shareholders’ and 
creditors’ interests in insolvency. The appointment of CAMAC to explore policy 
options and to advise Parliament is a step in the right direction. CAMAC has 
been asked by the government to consider and report on the following matters: 
1 Should shareholders who acquired shares as a result of misleading conduct 
by a company prior to its insolvency be able to participate in an insolvency 
proceeding as unsecured creditors for any debt that may arise out of that 
misleading conduct? 
2 If so, are there any reforms to the statutory scheme that would facilitate the 
efficient administration of insolvency proceedings in the presence of such 
claims? 
3 If not, are there any reforms to the statutory scheme that would better 
protect shareholders from the risk that they may acquire shares on the basis 
of misleading information?145 
In formulating future legislative policy, we do not advocate a general principle 
of postponing to the claims of general creditors all claims by disappointed 
shareholders against an insolvent company. 
C  Rejection of Blanket Subordination 
We have argued elsewhere that a policy of blanket subordination of 
shareholder interests, modelled on § 510(b) of the US Bankruptcy Code, is 
undesirable from a policy perspective.146 It is a blunt instrument that would, inter 
alia, frustrate the raison d’être of consumer protection laws and ignore 
Australia’s modern corporate milieu with its increased focus on investor 
protection. There is a real risk, as recognised by Gleeson CJ in Sons of Gwalia, 
that current investor protection laws may be ‘illusory’ if the claims of those who 
are given the apparent benefit of legislative protection are subordinated to the 
 
144 Kenneth B Davis Jr, ‘The Status of Defrauded Securityholders in Corporate Bankruptcy’ [1983] 
Duke Law Journal 1, 3. 
145 See Letter from Chris Pearce (Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer) to Richard St John 
(Convenor of the CAMAC), 6 February 2007 <http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/by 
Headline/PDFReference/$file/Ref_Sons_of_Gwalia.pdf>. 
146 Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and Statutory Debt Subordination’, above n 78, 291–2. 
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claims of ordinary creditors.147 A policy of blanket shareholder subordination 
would make a mockery of the importance of our continuous disclosure laws, 
with their emphasis on a preventative and compensatory role. Blanket 
subordination of shareholder interests, cautions Davis,148 would strike at the 
heart of the compensatory objective embodied in the various securities remedies. 
Furthermore, a policy of blanket subordination would make insolvent companies 
judgment-proof in respect of securities claims, as demonstrated by the Enron and 
WorldCom experiences in the US,149 and increase the risk of moral hazard 
through deceptive and misleading practices. 
By the same token, an unfettered policy of shareholder parity with creditors’ 
claims in insolvency would unjustifiably give shareholders the best of both 
worlds — gains when the company prospers and participation with creditors if it 
fails. Kirby J appropriately recognised the resultant unfairness in transferring 
shareholder investment risks to creditors in the following observation: 
investors … are not involved in the provision of goods and services to the 
company, as ordinary creditors generally are. Their interest in membership of 
the company is with a view to their own individual profit. Necessarily, their 
investment in the company involves risks … [and] the purchase of shares will 
commonly entail a measure … of speculation. Such speculation would 
ordinarily be expected to fall on the shareholders themselves, not shared with 
general creditors who would thereby end up underwriting the investors’ 
speculative risks.150 
D  Limited Shareholder Subordination 
Between the two extremes of blanket subordination and total shareholder 
parity discussed above, we see a viable middle path which adopts a more 
nuanced approach to subordination that combines features of both policy 
options. In addressing the future shape of Australia’s insolvency laws, we 
advocate the need for a targeted, distinctive and consequently, limited approach 
to shareholder subordination. 
In advocating this policy option, we distinguish clearly between two types of 
risk. It is readily accepted that the risk of business failure not involving 
misleading conduct falls on the shareholder as the quid pro quo for limited 
liability. To that extent, we agree with the general remarks made by Callinan and 
Kirby JJ on the unfairness for creditors to underwrite the shareholders’ 
speculative investment risk. In such instances, the case for shareholder 
subordination is justified. However, we draw a line at the risk of shareholders 
being misled into purchasing their shares and the policy of blanket subordination 
in such instances. 
Within this model of limited shareholder subordination, we draw a further 
distinction. In particular, we advocate that newly defrauded shareholders, as 
 
147 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 240. 
148 Davis, above n 144, 3. 
149 See Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and Statutory Debt Subordination’, above n 78, 282 
for a discussion of: Re Enron Corp, 341 BR 141 (SD NY, 2006); Re WorldCom Inc, 329 BR 10 
(SD NY, 2005). 
150 Sons of Gwalia (2007) 232 ALR 232, 262–3. 
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opposed to existing shareholders, should not have their claims subordinated. At 
first blush, this model appears to be inconsistent and unfair in its treatment of 
defrauded shareholders. The justification for this distinction, however, arises 
from the informational asymmetries that exist between existing and future 
shareholders and general unsecured creditors.151 As we note elsewhere,152 new 
shareholders investing in the company do not, ex ante, have the rights and 
powers of existing shareholders and depend upon publicly available information 
to price their risk in purchasing shares. In this regard, they are in a similar 
position to small contract creditors (such as trade suppliers) who are unable to 
bargain for security rights and must rely upon publicly available information to 
price their risk in providing goods or services on credit. 
We therefore advocate the formulation of a statutory rule that would 
subordinate existing shareholders from claiming misrepresentation damages in 
insolvency, but would allow new ‘outside’ shareholders to maintain such claims 
as unsecured creditors. Such an approach, we believe, has the added benefit of 
striking an appropriate balance between encouraging investor confidence in 
contributing additional capital to equity markets, and allaying some of the 
concerns in the debt capital markets because the large number of existing 
shareholders will be subordinated to their position. 
E  The Need for Law Reform 
The effectiveness of the subordination model advocated depends on other 
significant accompanying reforms. First, ‘process’ reform will be required to 
maintain the principal objectives of external administration discussed above in 
Part IV. As part of that reform, attention needs to be focused on the optimal 
manner of determining ‘proof’ of the claim. Secondly, the civil liability 
provisions for involvement in the company’s contravention of the continuous 
disclosure laws will require revisiting to achieve optimal deterrence in fraudulent 
conduct. This is an important consideration which underpins the limited 
subordination model advanced in this case note. 
From a policy perspective, it is arguable that the current legal framework for 
statutory liability is defective. It wrongly places the emphasis on corporate 
liability rather than on the individuals involved in a contravention of the 
continuous disclosure provisions. Although the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
provides for liability for both parties,153 our concern is that the current law 
signals a bias towards the burden of damages claims for fraudulent conduct 
falling onto the company, and thus in effect, on most of its innocent shareholders 
 
151 See further Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and Statutory Debt Subordination’, 
above n 78, 297. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 674 (continuous disclosure obligation), 1317HA (compensation 
order may be made against a person for breach of, inter alia, s 674) allow an investor to sue both 
a corporation and/or a person involved in the contravention for damages for failure to maintain 
proper disclosure to the market. Similarly, s 1041I allows an investor to sue both a corporation 
and/or a person involved in the contravention for damages for misleading or deceptive conduct 
in relation to financial services. 
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rather than the managerial actors who are truly culpable.154 This concern arises 
from what we see as a lacuna in the legal treatment of sanctions for directors 
involved in the company’s failure to make mandatory disclosure. 
The current law under-deters securities fraud in the following way. A breach of 
s 764(2A) by a director attracts the financial services civil penalty provision. In 
turn, this means that a defaulting director may be subjected to either a pecuniary 
penalty order under s 1317G or a compensation order under s 1317HA. Cru-
cially, notwithstanding the director’s involvement in the breach of the Act and 
subsequent defrauding of innocent shareholders who may have purchased 
securities, the director still enjoys the freedom to manage the corporation. 
Remarkably, from a deterrence perspective, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
offers no protection against future fraudulent conduct for this offence through a 
disqualification order. The court may only disqualify a director from managing a 
corporation if they have breached a ‘civil penalty/scheme provision’.155 Con-
tinuous disclosure provisions, however, are ‘financial services civil penalty 
provisions’ (under s 1317DA) which means a disqualification order could not be 
made.156 Furthermore, statutory misleading or deceptive conduct provisions are 
neither civil penalty nor financial services civil penalty provisions. Their 
remedies are restricted to damages,157 which whilst offering a compensatory 
remedy, provide inadequate protection against future breaches. 
In this way, current regulatory policy undermines the deterrence objective 
against fraudulent conduct by directors and consequently, to some degree, blunts 
the effectiveness of the model we propose. To fulfil the deterrence promise and 
threat, the way forward is to refocus the statutory liability provisions onto 
directors and other culpable insiders.158 
This reform would go some way to ensure that the costs of fraudulent conduct 
in securities actions do not fall on innocent shareholders via large penalties being 
imposed on corporations. Instead, ideally, the cost of such fraudulent conduct, 
both through court penalties and also through the business cost of increased 
directors’ and officers’ insurance premiums in securities claims, should fall 
primarily on the perpetrators to promote a sound policy result. In advancing 
these views, we do not reject the role of corporate liability. It has a residual role 
to play in a scheme which shifts the primary liability on managers and insiders. 
 
154 For discussion on how enterprise liability imposes costs of fraud upon innocent shareholders: 
see Jennifer H Arlen and William J Carney, ‘Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: 
Theory and Evidence’ [1992] University of Illinois Law Review 691, 698–700; Donald C 
Langevoort, ‘Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud’ (1996) 38 Arizona Law 
Review 639, 648–50; John C Coffee Jr, ‘Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and Its Implementation’ (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 1534. 
155 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206C(1).  
156 See Austin and Ramsay, above n 69, 573, where the learned authors refer to the omission of 
disqualification orders as ‘odd’. 
157 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041I. 
158 Coffee, above n 154. 
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F  Evolution or Revolution? 
The surprising lack of judicial consideration of the rationale of s 563A (and its 
predecessors) prior to the High Court decision in Sons of Gwalia does not 
necessarily mean that the judicial interpretation afforded by the High Court is 
revolutionary. The conclusion reached by the High Court in Sons of Gwalia was 
not written from a clean slate. It is based on existing precedent (particularly the 
House of Lords’ decision in Soden) and reflects, rightly or wrongly, a particular 
view of the implicit parliamentary intention regarding the intersection between 
shareholder and creditor rights in insolvency. 
The majority decision in Sons of Gwalia, through principles of statutory 
interpretation, construed s 563A in a way that does not cut down or reduce the 
availability or effectiveness of consumer protection remedies conferred by 
statute. Whether intentional or not, the majority decision maintains the practical 
efficacy of these provisions. Viewed in this context, devoid of the hysteria, the 
decision in Sons of Gwalia is far from revolutionary. It is underpinned by 
protective statutory provisions which, as observed by Gleeson CJ, have now 
armed investors with statutory rights. Significantly, there has been judicial 
recognition of this trend since at least 1991.159 
Based on the authoritative decision in Sons of Gwalia, and subject to 
CAMAC’s law reform recommendations, it appears that Australian company law 
is evolving to a position where shareholders’ protective rights are valued and 
enforced, albeit at the expense of unsecured creditors, in corporate insolvencies. 
This raises the pertinent question of whether such values are, or ought to be, 
permissible. 
Elizabeth Warren, a respected US bankruptcy scholar notes that, ‘[b]y 
definition, the distributional issues arising in bankruptcy involve costs to some 
and benefits to others.’160 It is trite to observe that enforcing the collection right 
of secured creditors often comes at a cost of defeating the collection rights of 
unsecured creditors whose claims are discharged without payment. Similarly, a 
priority payment to one unsecured creditor, such as an employee, necessarily 
leaves less for remaining creditors. Such values exist in the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) distributional scheme and have been given credence by Parliament.161 
Should Parliament take the next step by explicitly endorsing the value espoused 
by the majority judgment in Sons of Gwalia? 
On one hand, it is arguable that the High Court’s decision in Sons of Gwalia is 
sufficiently clear to render legislative amendment aimed at clarifying the 
position of shareholder claims unnecessary, as they currently fit within the broad 
notion of ‘contingent creditors’ for the purposes of the Act. However, on the 
other hand, it may be advisable (at least for the purposes of greater legislative 
certainty) that s 563A be amended for two reasons. 
First, to explicitly confirm that the focus of shareholder subordination under 
s 563A is on the nature of the claim rather than on the person bringing the claim. 
 
159 Re Pyramid Building Society (in liq) (1991) 6 ACSR 405, 409 (Vincent J). 
160 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 775, 789. 
161 Employee entitlements and personal injury claims have been given priority ranking in 
insolvency above other general creditor claims: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 556, 560. 
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The seeming acceptance by the majority of the position taken in Soden, as well 
as the general tenor of the majority judgments, lends support for the view that 
the only claims subordinated by s 563A are those that are exclusively given to 
shareholders either under the Act or by the statutory contract embodied in the 
corporate constitution. Secondly, in support of the limited subordination model 
we propose, to draw a further distinction in the compensation claims between 
new and existing misled shareholders for the reasons advanced earlier. 
VI  CONCLUSION 
Sons of Gwalia goes to the heart of the different philosophies underpinning 
risk allocation in insolvency law. The judicial uncertainty on the interpretation of 
s 563A has now been resolved by the High Court in favour of limited 
subordination of shareholders claims in insolvency. The majority High Court 
decision, whether intentionally or not, has exposed the hitherto buried legal path 
towards a legislative policy of limited shareholder subordination. Uncertainty, 
however, remains in some quarters of the commercial community as to whether 
the decision in Sons of Gwalia represents a sound legislative policy outcome. 
We have argued for legislative amendment to ensure an appropriate balance in 
the allocation of risk between investors and creditors and the priorities between 
them upon insolvency. The approach advocated here, and elsewhere by the 
authors,162 in the treatment of defrauded shareholders’ claims adopts this 
yardstick for law reform. In advocating a policy of limited shareholder 
subordination, a variant on that in Sons of Gwalia, we aim to strike a delicate 
balance without resulting in a massive shift of power from creditors to 
shareholders in insolvencies. Simultaneously, we acknowledge the serious role 
that the current statutory landscape and public and private remedies, discussed 
earlier,163 plays for investor protection. This is particularly significant in light of 
the fact that Australians have among the highest recorded levels of share 
ownership in the world.164 
For the law reform model advocated to be viable and efficient, however, it 
must be accompanied by two other reforms. First, ‘process’ reforms dealing with 
administrative burdens and procedural matters in external administration are 
essential. This must be done to resolve current uncertainty and efficiency 
concerns, discussed above in Part IV. Until then, the absence of clear legislative 





162 Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia and Statutory Debt Subordination’, above n 78; Jason 
Harris and Anil Hargovan, ‘Sons of Gwalia: Navigating the Line between Membership and 
Creditor Rights in Corporate Insolvencies’ (2007) 25 Company and Securities Law Journal 7; 
Hargovan and Harris, ‘Sons of Gwalia: Policy Issues Raised’, above n 94. 
163 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 553A; Webb (1993) 179 CLR 15, 31–3 (Mason CJ, Deane, 
Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
164 Australian Stock Exchange Ltd, Australia’s Share Owners: An ASX Study of Share Investors in 
2004 (2005). 
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rights upon insolvency will remain problematic for all stakeholders (sharehold-
ers, the credit market and insolvency practitioners). Secondly, to achieve the 
optimal deterrence value of the policy objective advocated in this case note, it is 
essential for law reform to go further in transferring the burden of damages 
claims for fraudulent conduct from the company, and in effect its shareholders, 
onto the managerial actors who are truly culpable. 
